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ABSTRACT
The main objective of the article is to determine, on the example
of the communes of the Małopolska Province, the factors that
affect the efficiency of communal investment expenditures, with
particular emphasis on social participation. In order to achieve
this aim, appropriate two-stage empirical studies were designed.
In the first stage, the efficiency of communal investment expend-
iture was determined using the DEA and order-m methods for all
studied local government units. In turn, the second stage of the
empirical study was based on an econometric analysis, which
indicated that the examined efficiency is influenced by the follow-
ing factors: location of the commune in the Cracow metropolitan
area, level of communal investment expenditure per capita, inten-
sity of use of external sources of financing communal investment,
and level of social participation in the commune.
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1. Introduction
The basic task of communes is to meet the needs of the local community (Witkowski
& Kiba-Janiak, 2014). This task is largely implemented through communal invest-
ments in technical and social infrastructure. Local government investments have their
own unique characteristics, including high capital intensity, irreversibility of the
effects of investment decisions, high risk of investment failure and a significant
impact on local development. Taking into account the features of local government
investments and the limited financial resources of communes, it should be stated that
the decisions made concerning the implementation of communal projects in the field
of social or technical infrastructure should be as rational as possible, with the aim of
achieving the continuous efficient management of public funds.
One factor that may assist in the more efficient spending of investment funds in
communes is social participation, which nowadays plays an increasingly important
role in local public administration (Strange, 2008). Social participation allows the
local community to influence the decisions made by the public administration, which
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translates into greater understanding of the needs of citizens and increased effective-
ness in meeting them.
Moreover, according to the public choice theory, politicians are more motivated by
personal interests than public ones. A public authority aims above all to win the next
election and politicians can also act to increase their private wealth. In order to limit
the harmful influence of politicians, it is necessary to extend democratic control over
them, which undoubtedly enables the processes of social participation. Therefore,
based on these premises, it can be stated that the high involvement of citizens in pub-
lic decision-making processes will translate into more efficient management of public
funds, including investments.
In the face of this research problem, the main goal of the article is to determine,
on the example of the majority of the communes of Małopolska Province, the factors
that affect the efficiency of communal investment expenditures, with particular
emphasis on social participation. From a theoretical point of view, the aim of the art-
icle is to draw attention to the problem of the principal–agent, which occurs between
the local authority and the local community. In particular, our empirical research
aims to verify the hypothesis that social participation is one of the factors enabling citi-
zens to supervise politicians (agents), which leads to an increase in the efficiency of
their actions, including their spending of public investment funds.
The period of the designed study covered the years 2010–2016. Both the period
and the geographical scope of the research resulted mainly from the availability of
statistical data. The research methodology of this work used objective statistical data
and was based on the following research methods: a taxonomic method, the DEA
method, the order-m method and the regression methods.
In a nutshell, the results of empirical research have shown that the efficiency of
communal investment expenditures is significantly influenced by the following fac-
tors: location of the commune in the Cracow metropolitan area, level of communal
investment expenditure per capita, intensity of the use of external sources of invest-
ment financing by the commune, and level of social participation in the commune.
2. Investment expenditure of polish local governments and sources of
financing – an international comparison
Nowadays, local governments are increasingly responsible for providing basic public
services and public infrastructure, as confirmed by data from the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2019). According to the OECD, on
average, in the years 2010–2016, the investment spending of Polish communes
accounted for 47.12% of general government investment (see Figure 1). During this
period, this value was one of the highest among OECD countries (the lowest share
was recorded in Greece (19.78%) and the highest in Israel (69.86%)).
The basic condition for the implementation of public investment by communes is
to have sufficient financial resources. In general, the sources for financing local gov-
ernment investments can be divided into own (understood as own revenues) and for-
eign (e.g. grants, credits, funds from bond issues). In Poland, the main source of
financing for communes is grants, which on average, in the years 2010–2016,
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amounted to as much as 60% of local government revenues (see Table 1). In this
respect, similarities can be observed between the Polish and Hungarian, Danish and
Korean local governments.
According to the literature on the subject, however, the key to ensuring that com-
munes provide an adequate level of goods and services is for them to have sufficient
own revenues. This also vests officials with accountability vis-a-vis their voters, which
contributes to more efficient spending of public funds (Martinez-Vazquez, 2015). It
should be noted that the level of a commune’s own revenues depends primarily on
the tax system adopted in any given state and the autonomy of local governments in
shaping it. OECD countries exhibit a very large variation in this respect (see Table 1).
In some, such as Belgium, Estonia, France, Ireland, Lithuania, New Zealand, Slovakia
and the United Kingdom, property taxes constitute the dominant group in the struc-
ture of local government tax revenues. An entirely different tax system operates in
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Norway, Sweden and Poland, where the main
local tax revenues come from income, profits and capital gains.
Large disparities also exist among OECD countries in terms of the autonomy of
the tax system. In Poland, as much as 59% of the tax revenues of local governments
are generated within a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split can be
changed unilaterally by the central government. Under this agreement, Polish local
governments receive a predetermined percentage of taxes on income (both individual
and corporate). It should, therefore, be noted that Polish communes do not have any
Figure 1. Local government investment spending as a percentage of general government invest-
ment in the OECD countries (average values for the years 2010–2016). Source: own study based on
data from OECD.
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tax autonomy in this respect. The only leeway Polish local governments have in
determining their own tax revenues is the possibility to set the rates of property tax,
which constitutes about 30% of their tax revenues. This autonomy, however, is lim-
ited by the government, which sets maximum rates for this tax. Moreover, unlike


































Austria Grants 67 0 15 16 69 E 65
Belgium Grants 53 34 8 57 1 B1 92
Czech Republic Grants 44 49 46 5 0 B2 100
Denmark Grants 61 89 0 11 0 B1 89
Estonia Grants 86 0 21 79 0 B2 85
Finland Taxes 45 93 0 7 0 B1 86
France Taxes 47 0 34 58 8 A1 46
Germany Grants 43 80 7 13 0 B2/D2 42/43
Greece Grants 68 0 8 92 0 B2 93
Hungary Grants 66 0 82 18 0 B2 96
Iceland Taxes 74 81 1 18 0 B2 99
Ireland Grants 53 0 0 100 0 B2 92
Israel Grants 47 0 19 81 0 E 95
Italy Grants 46 28 54 16 2 B2 71
Japan Grants 46 47 23 28 2 B1 58
Korea Grants 60 18 47 24 9 B2 83
Latvia Taxes 56 85 1 14 0 D3 86
Lithuania Grants 90 0 13 79 8 No data No data
Luxembourg Grants 54 92 3 5 0 B2 89
Mexico Grants 87 1 2 84 13 A2 100
Netherlands Grants 75 0 11 47 42 B1 68
New Zealand Taxes 53 0 7 93 0 A1 99
Norway Grants 49 88 1 11 0 B2 99
Poland Grants 60 60 9 30 1 D3 59
Portugal Grants 43 29 37 33 1 B2 76
Slovak Republic Grants 74 0 33 67 0 B2 96
Slovenia Grants 42 77 9 14 0 D4 77
Spain Taxes 49 17 40 43 0 B2 51
Sweden Taxes 55 97 0 3 0 B1 98
Switzerland Taxes 58 82 0 15 3 B2 98
Turkey Grants 72 0 36 52 12 D3 80
United Kingdom Grants 71 0 0 100 0 B1 96
Notes: The table shows the average values for the years 2010–2016. Conversely, the tax autonomy assessment con-
cerns the year 2014.
aA1, A2, B1, B2, D2, D3, D4, E – symbols denote classification from full taxing power to no taxing power. Meaning
(from OECD): A1 – the local government can set the rate and any reliefs without needing to consult the central
government, A2 – the local government can set the rate and any reliefs after consulting with the central govern-
ment, B1 – the local government can set the tax rate, and the central government does not set upper or lower lim-
its on the rate chosen, B2 – the local government can set the tax rate, and the central government does set upper
and/or lower limits on the rate chosen, D2 – there is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split can be
changed only with the consent of local governments, D3 – there is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue
split can be changed unilaterally by the central government, but less frequently than once a year, D4 – there is a
tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split is determined annually by the central government, E – other
cases in which the central government sets the rate and base of the local government tax.
Source: Own study based on data from: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2019),
International Monetary Fund (2019).
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many other countries where the basis for calculating property tax is the capital or
rental value of a given property, Poland taxes property according to size, expressed in
square metres or hectares (without any consideration for its market value). This
results in insufficient revenues from this type of tax (Felis & Rosłaniec, 2017) and
very high tax rates at an average of 80–95% of the maximum rate depending on the
type of property (Ministry of Finance, 2019). As a whole, the ability to shape tax rev-
enues autonomously is curtailed, which forces Polish local governments to look for
other sources of financing their infrastructural investments. As Martinez-Vazquez
(2015) stresses, however, the ability of local governments to cater for their own
required financing for public investments should be a feature practised worldwide. In
order to meet the needs of public investment, communes use other conventional
sources of revenue, that is, grants and borrowing. In particular, credit can be an
adequate source of financing for local government investments if access to it is pro-
vided in a disciplined manner. Otherwise, it may lead to overspending.
Further, local governments in various countries are trying to develop novel ways
of financing their investments. Revenues generated from public investments increas-
ing the value of land are one such example. In Poland, the instrument par’excellence
for this is the betterment levy, which consists in the commune collecting a fee calcu-
lated on the basis of the increase in the value of real estate engendered by the con-
struction of technical infrastructure by the local government. Communes are free to
set the betterment levy rate, with the proviso that it does not exceed 50% of the
increase in the value of real estate. Due to social pressure, however, Polish local gov-
ernments very often fail to collect such fees (Supreme Audit Office, 2019) or they set
the rate at a very low level (e.g., in the city of Dąbrowa Gornicza, the rate was 3% for
a time, and then, as a result of pressure from residents, the betterment levy was com-
pletely abolished).
Another innovative mechanism of financing investments in communes is the use
of public–private partnerships (PPP). The data for the years 2009–2019, however,
indicate that projects under PPP constituted only a small fraction of all local govern-
ment investments. In particular, in the period in question, 564 PPP procedures were
announced, of which only 137, with a total value of PLN 6.034 billion, have been or
are currently realised (Ministry of Funds & Regional Policy, 2019). Although local
governments are responsible for 122 out of the 137 PPP cases, taking into account
the total value of investment projects, it should be stated that this type of financing
has not been successful among Polish communes.
In summary, local governments around the world abide to different investment
support schemes. Therefore, it is extremely important that the investment activity of
communes continues to be the subject of investigation, in particular with regard to
the identification of factors that may increase the efficiency of public investment
expenditure.
It has become clear that Polish local governments lack sufficient autonomy to
shape their own revenues. Therefore, in order to implement infrastructure invest-
ments, Polish communes should concentrate on external sources of financing, the
wise use of which may increase expenditure efficiency (Marcinek, Czempas, &
Kobinski, 2014).
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3. Factors affecting local government efficiency
3.1. Social participation
3.1.1. Review of previous research
Literature on the factors influencing the efficiency of communal investment expend-
iture is rare. Therefore, the review of the relevant studies was extended to other types
of efficiency related to the activity of local government.
In research conducted so far, the most frequently analysed factors influencing the
efficiency of the local government sector in terms of social participation, are: turnout
in local government elections and the share of people entitled to vote (Borge, Falch,
& Tovmo, 2008; Bosch, Espasa, & Mora, 2012; Da Cruz & Marques, 2014; Geys,
Heinemann, & Kalb, 2010; Revelli & Tovmo, 2007; St'astna & Gregor, 2011; 2014).
The direction of the impact of this factor, based on this study, is usually positive, that
is, higher turnout in local government elections determines higher efficiency of the
local public sector.
Very interesting research was also conducted by Giordano, Tommasino, and
Casiraghi (2009), who showed that the higher the interest in politics of the popula-
tion, the bigger the efficiency of public services in Italian provinces.
The influence of direct instruments on local government efficiency was also
studied in the literature. Only one empirical paper, however, contained such a study.
This analysis was conducted by Asatryan and De Witte (2015) and concerned the
impact of citizens’ initiatives on the efficiency of the local public sector. The results
of the above-mentioned study indicated that the presence of forms of direct democ-
racy in a given commune significantly increases the analysed efficiency.
Another group of factors affecting local government efficiency concerns determi-
nants which describe social participation in terms of information. In particular, there
is research that examines whether the scope and content of local newspapers may
affect public sector efficiency. The obtained results indicated that the greater the
range of local newspapers, the higher the local government efficiency (Bruns &
Himmler, 2011).
3.1.2. Theoretical framework
Social participation is a phenomenon defined as the involvement of citizens in public
decision-making (Beirele & Cayford, 2002). The degree of participation of citizens in
the process of managing a local government unit may be highly differentiated, and it
results both from the level of activity of the local community and the degree of open-
ness of public administration to given forms of participation. In the literature on the
subject, the best-known ladder of social participation, defining the forms of citizens’
participation in public governance, was conceptualised by Arnstein (1969). She distin-
guishes eight levels of social participation in the ladder, which translate into three
forms of cooperation between citizens and the public administration. The first two
levels, manipulation and therapy, actually mean no social participation, only denoting
the preparation of citizens for the process of co-decision in public matters. The next
levels of this participatory ladder are: information, consultation and placation. They
consist of so-called apparent activities which, despite allowing citizens to participate
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in the decision-making process, do not constitute binding forms of cooperation between
them and public authorities. In this situation, the local community participates in con-
sultations, advises and receives information from government representatives. The pro-
posals made by citizens, however, only have a consultation character and do not have to
be accepted by the public administration. The last form of public participation, defined
as socialisation of power, includes: partnership, delegation and citizen control. Only
then, will citizens have a real influence on the decisions made by local authorities.
The participatory ladder presented by Arnstein (1969) can be narrowed down to
three elements: information, consultation and co-decision. Each of the above forms of
social participation is implemented through appropriate instruments, which include,
among others: public consultations, discussion panels, referendums and participa-
tory budgets.
From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between social participation and
the efficiency of communal investment expenditure can be analysed on the basis of
Niskanen’s economic theory of bureaucracy and, in particular, the problem of the
principal–agent (Geys et al., 2010). In this model, local authorities function as agents
acting for citizens (principals) who want to satisfy their needs as much as possible.
There is a conflict of interest here, however, that manifests itself in the fact that
agents can benefit more from less productive activities, such as salary increases or
overstaffing (Borge et al., 2008). Moreover, politicians very often act in favour of cer-
tain interest groups and seek to increase private wealth at the expense of citizens
(LegieRdz, 2005), which can be explained by the theory of public choice. According to
this theory, politicians behave in a similar way to consumers and entrepreneurs,
which means that they tend to not meet the needs of society. In return, their aim is
to maximise their own benefits, in particular income, power and prestige. In this
case, politicians are very often susceptible to the influence of certain narrow interest
groups, which leads to decisions concerning the implementation of infrastructure
investments being beneficial only for a certain group of residents. The consequence
of acting against the public interest is inefficient dispersion of technical and social
infrastructure, which reduces the level of efficiency of public spending.
It is important to stress that the inefficient activities of politicians as agents can be
limited by various factors. One of the most important is the ability of citizens to
supervise politicians. In this case, there is a decrease in asymmetry of information
between the public and local authorities, which leads to a reduction in expenditure
wasting (Geys et al., 2010) and, consequently, in an increase in the efficiency of
expenditures. Therefore, it may be stated that social participation is an extremely
important factor influencing the efficiency of communal investment expenditure.
The impact of social participation on the analysed efficiency may be direct or
indirect. The indirect method is based primarily on active monitoring of politicians
through high turnout in local government elections. As a result of high voter turnout,
one can expect that politicians will be more inclined in the face of high pressure to
make decisions that will benefit the entire local community rather than narrow inter-
est groups (Borge et al., 2008). The emergence of pressure causing the rational activ-
ity of local authorities may result not only from high voter turnout but also from a
high number of associations, foundations or non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
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in the area of a given local government. Moreover, the influence of social participa-
tion on the efficiency of communal investment expenditure may also be exerted
through direct supervision of local authorities’ activities (Asatryan & De Witte, 2015).
In the case of direct impact of social participation on the efficiency of communal
investment expenditure, exercising control by citizens boils down not only to assess-
ing or consulting investment activities undertaken by communal authorities, but also
to co-managing activities (for example, by using civic budget), which directly contrib-
utes to correcting erroneous policies of local authorities.
It should be noted that social participation can also have a darker side. In this
instance, reference can be made to the theory of social capital, which emphasises that
individual or collective actions undertaken for the good of an individual or a group
may be, at the same time, harmful to other persons and society at large (Numerato &
Baglioni, 2012). A similar situation may arise in the case of social participation. In par-
ticular, there may be influential interest groups in the local government whose objec-
tives are not consistent with those of the local community. By referring directly to
communal investment expenditure, the above-mentioned interest groups may lobby for
the implementation of investments that are beneficial only for them. In such a situ-
ation, the efficiency of investment expenditure decreases because the implemented proj-
ects do not contribute to the development of the commune as a whole.
3.2. Additional factors
The participation of citizens in public management is not the only determinant of the
efficient management of public funds. Therefore, other factors influencing how public
expenditure is shaped on the local government level should be identified. Narbon-
Perpi~na and De Witte (2017b) distinguish the following groups of factors affecting
local government efficiency: social and demographic, economic, political, financial,
geographical and natural as well as institutional and management.
Increasing investment expenditure efficiency may also depend on other aspects of
the functioning of communal self-government, which were not mentioned in the
Narbon-Perpi~na and De Witte (2017b) review article. In particular, the role of real
estate management, spatial management and the use of external sources of financing
communal investments should be emphasised here. These factors may turn out to be
extremely important, especially in the context of investment expenditures.
In the case of real estate management, the role of the commune in creating appro-
priate real estate resources for infrastructural investments can be mentioned. A com-
mune, which actively and timely acquires resources for future investments, minimises
the risk of failure of planned projects, which in all probability may increase the
investment expenditure efficiency.
No less important is spatial planning. In this case, it is primarily a matter of draw-
ing up local spatial development plans. In such a planning document, the areas of
potential communal investment are defined. Local spatial development plans are
drawn up in a multi-stage process, in which a lot of time is devoted to discussing the
future shape of the document. Therefore, the created solutions are well thought out
and widely accepted from society. On this basis, it can be concluded that the
484 M. TOMAL AND A. NALEPKA
adoption of a local spatial development plan in a given area should increase the effi-
ciency of communal investment expenditure.
As mentioned earlier, an increase of the examined efficiency may also be acceler-
ated by the smart use of external sources of financing communal investments.
External sources of financing are divided into repayable and non-repayable funds.
The latter most often concern funds from the European Union, the acquisition of
which is conditioned by the preparation of various analyses of the potential costs and
benefits of a given investment, which undoubtedly contributes to the implementation
of much more efficient investments in local government units.
The above-mentioned factors shaping the efficiency of local government can also
be classified according to the degree of dependence on local authorities. Taking this
type of criterion into account, it is possible to distinguish between them:
 factors fully or predominantly dependent on commune authorities
 factors partly dependent on commune authorities
 factors fully independent of commune authorities
The first of the above-mentioned groups contains factors, which are fully or pre-
dominantly dependent on the activities of the commune authorities. This area
includes such factors over which the commune, as a self-government unit, has direct
influence, and where the activity of self-government bodies may lead to significant
increase or decrease in the level of a given phenomenon. This group includes primar-
ily investment planning instruments, such as long-term investment plans or task
budgets. In addition, this group of factors should also include the rational manage-
ment of real estate, joint investments with other local governments and the use of
additional external sources of financing investment. Social participation is also
included here, the level of which can be directly shaped by local authorities in the
area of a given commune unit using various participation instruments.
Another group concerns factors that are only partly dependent on local authorities.
These factors cannot be directly shaped by the authorities, or the influence on them by
the commune authorities is negligible. One can mention here, among others, the level
of total income of the commune. This factor mainly depends on the state of develop-
ment of a given commune, and the presence of natural resources or large enterprises.
Although the local authorities have the possibility to influence the future income of the
commune, this influence is indirect. Another factor which, we estimate, should be
included in this group is the level of investment expenditures. It should be noted that
the level of such expenditures depends mainly on the available financial resources of
the commune, which are the result of income generated by the self-government unit.
This group also includes factors describing the number of inhabitants in a commune
or the share of councillors with higher education in the commune council. Although
the result of direct decisions made by voters, the latter factor is influenced by the local
authorities through the election campaign process.
The last group consists of factors fully independent of the commune authorities.
This includes, first of all, the type of commune and its specific location. These are
shaped neither directly nor indirectly by the commune authorities.
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4. Research methodology
4.1. Research sample and time range of the study
The study on the impact of social participation on the efficiency of communal invest-
ment expenditures will be conducted on the basis of data from communes of the
Małopolska Province. The narrowing down of the analysed local government units to
communes of the Małopolska Province results from the lack of availability of data for
other provinces. Moreover, cities with county rights, that is, Cracow, the City of
Tarnow and the City of Nowy Sącz, were excluded from the study. This is due to the
fact that these units are diametrically different from the other communes of the
Małopolska Province.
Furthermore, in order to increase the generalisability of research results to all com-
munes in Poland, the compatibility of the selected research sample and population
was checked. Two features were examined: the administrative structure of the com-
munes and the average amount of communal investment expenditure per capita.
Statistical tests showed that the communes of the Małopolska Province do not differ
significantly from the wider population in terms of the two above-mentioned charac-
teristics. Therefore, it may be stated that the research sample, selected in a targeted
manner, reflects well the scale of investment activity in all communes in Poland, both
in terms of size and structure, as the latter directly depends on the type of a given
commune (rural communes have different needs in terms of investment activity in
comparison to urban ones). On this basis, it can be reasonably expected that the fac-
tors identified in this study affecting the efficiency of communal investment expend-
iture in the Małopolska Province will also have a significant impact in other local
governments in Poland.
The temporal scope of the empirical research covers the period from 2010 to 2016
and also results mainly from the availability of data, in particular in terms of the use
of instruments of social participation by the communes. In addition, there are no
changes in the administrative structure of the examined communes in this period,
which makes the study consistent.
4.2. Specification of regression model
The next stage of the research was the construction of multiple regression models,
the aim of which is a statistical analysis of the impact of social participation on the
efficiency of communal investment expenditure. The starting point for the creation of
these models was the selection of other variables that may affect the efficiency of
investment expenditures. This stage is necessary to ensure that the obtained results
are not apparent. On the basis of data availability and the literature review, nine
control variables were proposed. Basic descriptive statistics for all variables in the
regression models are presented in Table 2. The initial regression models are cross-
sectional in nature. In particular, the average values of the variables from 2010 to
2016 are used. The application of another type of model, for example, a panel model,
is not possible due to the very limited access to data, especially in the scope of
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measuring the level of social participation, as well as the specifics of measuring the
efficiency of communal investment expenditures.
It should be noted that some variables are synthetic in nature, that is, their values
are calculated on the basis of several diagnostic characteristics. This occurs in the
case of variables concerning: social participation, rational real estate management and
the use of external sources of financing communal investments. Also, the dependent
variable, which describes the efficiency of communal investment expenditure, was cre-
ated on the basis of taxonomic analysis. The process of this research is presented in
the following subchapters.
In order to obtain proper model specification, it was checked whether the residuals
of the basic models contain spatial autocorrelation. If such autocorrelation is actually
present, the regression models that does not take into account spatial dependencies
are incorrect due to the problem of omitted variables (Mathur, 2019). The possibility
of spatial autocorrelation in this study is indicated by other empirical studies on local
government efficiency (Balaguer-Coll, Brun-Martos, Marquez-Ramos, & Prior, 2019;
Geys, 2006; Revelli & Tovmo, 2007), and Figure 2 that presents the investment
expenditure efficiency (using the DEA method) of the investigated communes.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for variables in regression models.
Shortcut Variable description Min Max Mean
Standard
deviation
Y Dependent variable. Measure calculated on
the basis of the DEA method and the
order-m method.
0.60 1.00 0.77 0.09
Z1 Dummy variable. 1 if a commune is located
in the Cracow metropolitan area, 0
if otherwise.
0 1 0.28 0.45
Z2 Dummy variable. 1 if a commune is an
urban or urban-rural unit, 0 if otherwise.
0 1 0.32 0.47
Z3 Average investment expenditures of the
commune per capita in the years
2010–2016 (PLN).
121.79 1,756.45 618.55 270.21
Z4 Average share of commune councillors with
higher education in the years
2010–2016 (%).
0.00 0.76 0.32 0.17
Z5 Average population of the commune in the
years 2010–2016.
2,484.14 55,177.71 13,428.11 9,809.60
Z6 Synthetic measure of rational real estate
management calculated on the basis of
the values of average diagnostic features
in the years 2010–2016.
0.01 0.61 0.30 0.15
Z7 Average total income of the commune per
capita in the years 2010–2016 (PLN).
2,399.23 4,875.64 3,139.02 440.01
Z8 Synthetic measure of the use by the
commune of additional, external sources
of investment financing calculated on the
basis of the value of average diagnostic
characteristics in the years 2010–2016.
0.27 0.70 0.44 0.05
Z9 Average area of the commune expressed in
km2 in the years 2010–2016.
17.00 287.00 82.27 41.43
SP Synthetic measure of the level of social
participation calculated on the basis of
the values of average diagnostic
characteristics in the years 2010–2016.
0.08 0.49 0.25 0.08
Source: Own study based on data from: Local Bank Data of Statistics Poland (2019), Statistical Office in Cracow
(2019), Regional Audit Chamber in Cracow (2019), Stanczyk Foundation (2019), Ministry of Finance (2019).
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In order to assess statistically the possibility of spatial dependencies, Moran’s I
tests were conducted for the residuals of the basic regression models. The statistics of
this test indicated that there is no spatial autocorrelation among the residuals. In add-
ition, we ran the LM-lag and LM-error tests, whose results confirm the absence of
spatial autocorrelation both in the dependent variables and in the error terms. For
the spatial autocorrelation tests, we used the spatial weight matrix, which was based
on the common borders of the analysed local governments units. In particular, the
elements of this matrix have two values: 1 – when there is a common border between
two communes; 0 – when there is no common border.
On the basis of the above tests, a regression model takes the following form:
Yi ¼ b0 þ b1Z1i þ b2Z2i þ b3Z3i þ b4Z4i þ b5Z5i þ b6Z6i þ b7Z7i
þb8Z8i þ b9Z9i þ b10SPi þ ei (1)
where i denotes commune; Y is the dependent variable calculated using the DEA
method or the order-m method; Z1, . . . ,Z9 and SP is a set of independent variables,
ei is the error term.
4.3. Method of measuring social participation, the use of external sources
of financing communal investments and rational real estate management
The phenomena describing social participation, the use of external sources of financ-
ing communal investments and rational property management are multidimensional
in nature, that is, they cannot be described with a single measure. Therefore, in order
to assess their level in a given commune, a taxonomic analysis will be used, which
Figure 2. Efficiency scores for examined local government units (using the DEA method). Source:
same as Table 2.
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makes it possible to describe a given phenomenon with any number of diagnostic fea-
tures. The process of this study is as follows:
 Selection of variables characterising the investigated phenomenon (a detailed list
of diagnostic features is presented in Table 3)
 Preliminary analysis of the variables adopted for the study in the scope of:
 level of variability – variables whose coefficient of variation value is equal to
or lower than 0.10 should be discarded from further analysis
 correlation with other variables – in case of correlation of a pair of variables
exceeding 0.70, one variable from the pair should be discarded
Table 3. Set of diagnostic features to calculate independent synthetic variables in the regres-
sion model.
Shortcut Variable description Unit Character
Social participation
P1 Average turnout in local government elections in 2010
and 2014.
% stimulant
P2 Average share of expenditures under village fundsa and
civic budgets in the investment expenditures of the
commune in the years 2010–2016.
% stimulant
P3 Average share of funds allocated to entities conducting
public benefit activities in total expenditures of the
commune in the years 2010–2016.
% stimulant
P4 Average share of the area of the commune covered by
drafts of local spatial development plans in the
years 2010–2016.b
% stimulant
P5 Average number of foundations in the private sector in the
years 2010–2016.
foundation stimulant
P6 Access to public information.c unit stimulant
P7 Average number of social associations and organisations in
the private sector per capita for the period 2010–2016.
entity stimulant
Use of external sources for financing communal investmentsd
ZF1 Share of investment expenditures in total expenditures. % stimulant
ZF2 Share of investment expenditures to free resources. % stimulant
ZF3 Share of return revenues in investment expenditures. % stimulant
ZF4 Share of operating surplus in total revenues. % stimulant
ZF5 Share of investment expenditures in total revenues. % stimulant
ZF6 Share of own revenues in total revenues. % stimulant
ZF7 Share of local government taxes in total revenues. % stimulant
ZF8 Share of subsidies in total revenues. % destimulant
ZF9 Share of total debt in total revenues. % destimulant
ZF10 Share of operating surplus and property revenues in
property expenses.
% destimulant
Rational real estate management
RGN1 Share of communal land in the area of the commune. % stimulant
RGN2 Share of communal land in perpetual usufructe in the area
of communal land.
% stimulant
RGN3 Share of the commune area covered by local spatial
development plans in the commune area.
% stimulant
aIn Polish law, the village fund is a type of civic budget.
bIn Polish law, local spatial development plans specify possible forms of land investment, and their projects are con-
sulted with residents.
cDiagnostic feature estimated by the Stanczyk Foundation. Higher values of this variable mean that the authorities
are more involved in informing the community about their activities.
dA set of measures for the use of external, additional sources of financing communal investments was proposed by
Kik and Nalepka (2016).
eIn Polish law, perpetual usufruct is a form of long-term paid lease.
Source: Same as Table 2.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 489
 Conversion of destimulants into stimulants by changing the character of destimu-
lants into the opposite one
 Standardisation of the variables to ensure comparability of the measures adopted
for analysis. The zero unitarisation formula is used in this article. The choice of
such a standardisation formula is highly beneficial, as it meets all the demands
established for this type of transformation. We can highlight here, the non-negative
values or stability of ranges of variability of normalised variables. The zero unitar-




where: sij – normalised value of the jth variable for the ith object, xij – the original value
of the jth variable for the ith object, maxi½xij – the maximum value of the jth variable
among the ith objects, mini½xij – the minimum value of the jth variable among the
ith objects
 Calculation of a synthetic indicator explaining a given phenomenon. In this article,





where wi – value of the synthetic indicator for the ith object, f – number of diag-
nostic features.
Preliminary analysis of diagnostic features in the scope of variability and mutual
correlation allowed to set the final list of characteristics used to estimate synthetic
variables in the regression models. In particular, the following diagnostic features
were removed from further analysis: ZF5, ZF6, ZF9, and P7:
4.4. Method of the measurement of communal investment
expenditure efficiency
The DEA method is used to measure the efficiency of investment expenditure of the
communes in the Małopolska Province. This is a non-parametric method that takes
into account a specified number of inputs and outputs, and determines the efficiency
of each analysed unit on the basis of linear programming (Skuflic, Rabar, & Sokcevic,
2010). The efficiency of each unit is determined as a quotient of the weighted sum of
outputs to the weighted sum of inputs, and then compared to the model observation.
Efficient units are on the production frontier and their efficiency value is 1.
Conversely, units whose efficiency values calculated with the use of DEA are smaller
than unity, are defined as inefficient. Within the framework of the DEA method, one
can distinguish output-oriented, input-oriented and non-oriented models. The choice
of a particular orientation depends on a number of factors that should be carefully
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determined in each case. In the study of Polish communal self-governments, one of
the prerequisites is the current law on public finance, which specifies that when
spending public funds, the administration should be guided by a best-results
policy from given expenditures (Public Finance Act, 2009, §44). Therefore, an output-
oriented model assuming variable returns to scale (BCC-O) was chosen to study the














vipij þ vo  0 ðj ¼ 1, . . . , nÞ
u1, u2, . . . , us  0
v1, v2, . . . , vm  0, vo free
(4)
where: ho – efficiency of the o-th object, vo – variable providing the convexity condi-
tion, m – number of inputs, s – number of outputs, n – number of objects, ur – rth
weight of a given output, vi – ith weight of a given input, pij – the ith input for the
jth object, arj – the rth output for the jth object.
The above model, which assumes variable returns to scale, seems to be more
accurate due to the different nature of the analysed units. This conclusion is also con-
firmed by Sekuła and Julkowski (2017), who investigated the efficiency of communal
expenditures internationally.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the DEA method has several drawbacks. In
particular, the sensitivity to outliers and susceptibility to measurement errors should
be mentioned here (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2019). Therefore, we have decided to use a
robust non-parametric methodology, namely the order-m method, which is outlined
in detail in the Daraio and Simar (2005) article. In the order-m method we set the
size of the artificial reference sample at 140 (from this value the results were stable)
and the number of resampling replications at 2000.
The use of the DEA and order-m methods to study local government efficiency
also requires the definition of inputs and outputs. In this study, a variable describing
the average value of investment expenditures of a municipality per capita in the
period 2010–2016 was used as an input. To the contrary, defining the effects of these
expenditures is a much more difficult task. The literature review conducted by
Narbon-Perpi~na and De Witte (2017a) revealed that in the field of local government
efficiency research, variables describing, among others, population size, building area,
administrative services, saturation of technical and social infrastructure, quality of
municipal services, quality of health services, quality of social services and the level of
public safety were assumed as the outputs. Moreover, it should be emphasised that,
in previous studies, several variables were taken as outputs or one synthetic variable
was calculated on the basis of selected diagnostic features. In our opinion, the most
accurate proposal in this respect was presented by Zimny (2008), who adopted as
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indicator the pace of socio-economic development of the commune. This indicator is
based on the taxonomic method presented in the previous subchapter, but instead of
static values of diagnostic variables, it adopts values of slope parameters of trend
lines, which are estimated for the assumed time period. Treating the problem of
measuring the effects of communal investment expenditures in this way ensures that
their dynamics are taken into account. It should be noted that the indicator outlined
by Zimny (2008), at its basis, assumes diagnostic features describing the development
of the commune from an economic aspect (e.g. new jobs) and a social aspect (e.g.
higher number of kindergartens). Determining the effects of communal investment
expenditures in this way is extremely relevant, because the new infrastructure that
results from these expenditures is one of the main factors driving the development of
a given territory (Wołowiec & Skica, 2013). To sum up, this article uses the approach
outlined by Zimny (2008) to determine the effects of communal investment expendi-
tures. Conversely, diagnostic features determining the pace of the socio-economic
development of communes were selected on the basis of the quality and availability
of public statistics data (none of the features was rejected after a preliminary analysis
of data consisting in checking the variation coefficients and mutual correlation). A
detailed list of the mentioned features is presented in Table 4.
5. Research results
5.1. Baseline regression models
The first stage of the empirical research was to estimate the efficiency of investment
expenditures in communes of the Małopolska Province. Using the DEA method, the
study revealed that only five communes out of 179 units proved to be efficient in
terms of investment expenditure. Similar results were observed with the order-m
method. In this case, ten municipalities were shown to be efficient or super-efficient.
It should be noted that rural communes dominate among efficient units, irrespective
of the efficiency measurement method.
Upon estimating the efficiency of communal investment expenditures, the next
stage of the analysis is estimation of the previously defined regression models.
Detailed results of this study are presented in Table 5. It should be noted that the
Table 4. Set of diagnostic features used to assess the pace of socio-economic development of
the examined communes.
Shortcut Variable description Unit Character
SE1 Average usable area of a flat per capita. m2 stimulant
SE2 Share of population using the sewage system. % stimulant
SE3 Number of children between 3–5 years old per 1 place in pre-school
education institutions.
person destimulant
SE4 Number of inhabitants per 1 pharmacy point. person destimulant
SE5 Net migration per 1,000 persons. person stimulant
SE6 Share of green areas in the total area of the commune. % stimulant
SE7 Number of people who work per 1,000 inhabitants. person stimulant
SE8 Number of economic entities per 1,000 inhabitants. entity stimulant
SE9 Own income of the commune per capita. PLN stimulant
Source: Same as Table 2.
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basic models include a number of insignificant variables. Therefore, the stepwise
regression procedure with backward elimination was applied.
The final regression models was positively verified in terms of collinearity and
residuals normality (at the level of a ¼ 0:01). Moreover, an HC estimator was used
because of the high probability of heteroskedasticity.
Based on the results of the final models, it can be concluded that apart from the
constant, only four variables turned out to be significant, in particular variables
Z1, Z3, Z8 and SP: In the case of variable Z1, describing the location of the com-
mune in the Cracow metropolitan area, an increase in its value by 1 results in an
increase in the dependent variable by ca. 0.03, while other factors remain unchanged.
This means that communes located closer to Cracow are more efficient than other
communes. This conclusion is consistent with expectations and other empirical stud-
ies (Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; St'astna & Gregor, 2011). Moreover, it should be
noted that variable Z1 can be classified into a group of factors fully independent
from local authorities.
The next variable, which turned out to be significant in the models, explains the
level of investment expenditures of the commune per capita. In this case, the esti-
mated parameter has a negative sign, which means that the increase in investment
expenditures of the commune results in a decrease in the efficiency of these expendi-
tures. In particular, along with other unchanged factors, the increase in investment
expenditures by PLN 100 causes a decrease in the explained variable by ca. 0.01. It
should also be emphasised that the level of investment expenditures depends mainly
on the income obtained by the commune, which confirms the value of the correlation
coefficient between these variables, which in this study is equal to 0.70. Therefore, the
Table 5. The results of regression model estimations.









modelb 0.25b 0.50b 0.75b
Constant 0.75746 0.68962 0.84683 0.74929 0.82726 0.77560 0.77449
Z1 0.03026 0.03384 0.02254 0.02613 –0.00060 0.01987 0.02911
Z2 –0.02290 – –0.02484 – – – –
Z3 –0.00012 –0.00015 –0.00012 –0.00017 –0.00020 –0.00021 –0.00018
Z4 –0.01736 – 0.00368 – – – –
Z5 0.000001 – 0.000001 – – – –
Z6 0.00859 – 0.01484 – – – –
Z7 –0.00002 – –0.00003 – – – –
Z8 0.24159 0.32030 0.21305 0.31870 0.14089 0.29466 0.34727
Z9 –0.00013 – –0.00008 – – – –
SP 0.12023 0.11919 0.10950 0.11575 0.04093 0.14403 0.20229
One percent level of significance.Five percent level of significance.Ten percent level of significance. N ¼ 179, R2  0:22: Estimations with robust standard errors.
aThe dependent variable calculated using the DEA method.
bThe dependent variable calculated using the order-m method.
a,bThe average value of VIF (Variance Inflation Factors), which is equal to 1.141, indicates that there is no multicolli-
nearity in the models (Trojanek, 2016). The Doornik–Hansen (ap-value ¼ 0:02, bp-value ¼ 0:08), Shapiro–Wilk
(ap-value ¼ 0:02, bp-value ¼ 0:04) and Lilliefors (ap-value ¼ 0:09, bp-value ¼ 0:05) tests prove that, at one percent
level of significance, the residuals in the models have a normal distribution. cThe quantile regression was calculated
for significant variables in the OLS final models.
Source: Same as Table 2.
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parameter sign obtained with variable Z3 should not raise any doubts. This is due to
the fact that communes with lower income may try to spend their funds in a much
more rational way. The negative correlation between efficiency and investment
expenditure is also confirmed by studies conducted by St'astna and Gregor (2011), as
well as by Sekuła and Julkowski (2015). Moreover, it should be noted that variable Z3
can be classified into the group of factors partly dependent on local authorities.
Another important variable in the final models, Z8, describes the level of use of
additional, external sources of financing investments by the commune. It should be
noted that this type of sources can include non-repayable resources such as grants, sub-
sidies, EU funds, as well as repayable resources such as loans, credits or bond issues.
Active diversification of investment financing sources through rational use of external
funds, especially non-repayable ones, may significantly increase the efficiency of com-
munal investment expenditures. It should be stressed that, to the best of our know-
ledge, there are no empirical studies that analyse the impact of this variable on local
government efficiency so widely. Only the components of the Z8 synthetic measure cal-
culated by us have been taken into account in the analyses conducted so far. One can
recall here the work of Zioło (2012), which indicated that the level of loans taken out
is positively correlated with the efficiency of investment expenditure. Research in this
area was also conducted by Karbownik and Kula (2009), who proved that the use of
EU funds by the commune significantly increases expenditure efficiency.
The final significant variable in the above models concerns the level of social par-
ticipation in a given local government unit. The estimated regression parameter
turned out to be positive, which means that an increase in social participation in a
given commune contributes to improving the efficiency of spending of communal
investment funds. In more detail, an increase in this synthetic measure by 0.01 or 0.1
results in an increase in the value of the dependent variable by 0.0012 and 0.012,
respectively, while other factors remain unchanged. The result obtained for this vari-
able is consistent with the theoretical considerations presented in this article. It
should also be noted that both the variable describing social participation and the
variable concerning the use of additional sources of investment financing by the com-
mune belong to the group of factors that are mostly dependent on local authorities.
Moreover, we decided to take a closer look at the relationship between social par-
ticipation and the analysed efficiency. Therefore, in order to describe fully the above
dependence we adopted the quantile regression method. Detailed results of this study
are presented in Table 5 and Figure 3. In particular, the findings reveal an inverted
U-shaped pattern among quantile regression coefficients for the variable describing
social participation. This result, however, requires further in-depth research because
of the very wide confidence interval.
5.2. Robustness checks
After estimating the baseline regression models (see Table 5), we considered some
robustness checks to control our results. In particular, we have estimated several new
models (only for variables significant in the baseline regression models, i.e. Z1, Z3,
Z8 and SP) taking into account the following problems:
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 A potential problem of endogeneity of variable Z3 resulting from reverse caus-
ation. It should be noted that inefficient local governments may spend higher
investment resources in order to ensure the same outcomes as effective units, that
is, inefficiency may affect the investment inclination of communes. In order to
control the problem of endogeneity, we used an instrumental variable that is a
time lag of variable Z3: As for each variable in our study we take into account the
average value from the years 2010–2016, there is no simple way to define the delay
of a variable. Therefore, as a lag for variable Z3, we have taken into account three
different possibilities, that is, their average values for years 2007–2013, 2008–2014
and 2009–2015.
 The possibility of a time lag between the social participation variable and the
studied efficiency. It should be noted that citizens dissatisfied with public spending
can put pressure on the authorities. It may take several years, however, for policy-
makers to correct wrong actions. In order to control the occurrence of this prob-
lem, we have included the variables explaining the level of social participation in
the examined communes for the years 2007–2013, 2008–2014 and 2009-2015 in
additional regression equations. It should be added that we have estimated models
that take into account both the current value of the SP variable and its time lags,
and time lags of the SP variable alone.
 In addition, the possibility of a joint occurrence of time lag between social partici-
pation and efficiency, as well as the problem of endogeneity were considered.
The results of the estimation of additional regression models (see Table 6) con-
firmed the conclusions of Table 5 that the current level of social participation has a
significant impact on the studied efficiency. In particular, the SP variable was signifi-
cant in almost all additional models, in some cases after the elimination of
Figure 3. The coefficients of the quantile regression model. Source: same as Table 2.
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insignificant variables. There is little support, however, for the conclusion that the
lagged variable of social participation (for 2008–2014) also has a significant impact
on the dependent variable.
Summarising the results obtained with the use of all regression models, it can be
stated that the research hypothesis presented at the beginning of the article, namely
Table 6. Estimations of additional OLS regression models.
Variable DEAa DEAa DEAa Order-mb Order-mb Order-mb
Models taking into account a potential endogeneity problem
Constant 0.68899 0.70247 0.68515 0.74764 0.76251 0.74672
Z1 0.03376 0.03522 0.03213 0.02593 0.02756 0.02522
Z3 –0.00016 –0.00008 –0.00025 –0.00017 –0.00009 –0.00022
Z320072013 0.000002 – – 0.00001 – –
Z320082014 – –0.00007 – – –0.00008 –
Z320092015 – – 0.00009 – – 0.00005
Z8 0.32158 0.29492 0.33678 0.32161 0.29219 0.32743
SP 0.11939 0.11440 0.12172 0.11620 0.11074 0.11708
Models taking into account lagged social participation variables
Variable DEAa DEAa,c Order-mb Order-mb,c
Constant 0.70891 0.68518 0.76855 0.73964
Z1 0.03647 0.03530 0.02928 0.02785
Z3 –0.00016 –0.00016 –0.00017 –0.00017
Z8 0.32686 0.36290 0.32530 0.36921
SP – 0.22663 – 0.27607
SP20072013 –0.37163 –0.31955 –0.29049 –0.22706
SP20082014 0.89466 0.94036 0.87832 0.93399
SP20092015 –0.47152 –0.73648 –0.53895 –0.86171
Models taking into account both a potential endogeneity problem and lagged social participation variablesd
Variable DEAa DEAa DEAa Order-mb Order-mb Order-mb
Constant 0.70757 0.72067 0.70312 0.76547 0.78007 0.76514
Z1 0.03632 0.03722 0.03491 0.02894 0.03001 0.02836
Z3 –0.00016 0.00010 –0.00026 –0.00018 –0.00011 –0.00023
Z320072013 0.000005 – – 0.00001 – –
Z320082014 – 0.00006 – – –0.00006 –
Z320092015 – – 0.00009 – – 0.00005
Z8 0.32936 0.30645 0.34022 0.33106 0.30530 0.33316
SP20072013 –0.36952 –0.38131 –0.33170 –0.28567 –0.29998 –0.26703
SP20082014 0.89752 0.82032 0.87223 0.88488 0.80546 0.86514
SP20092015 –0.47571 –0.39775 –0.47798 –0.54857 –0.46664 –0.54274
Models taking into account both a potential endogeneity problem and lagged social participation variablese
Variable DEAa,c DEAa,c DEAa,c Order-mb Order-mb,c Order-mb,c
Constant 0.68208 0.69682 0.68091 0.73430 0.75096 0.73757
Z1 0.03497 0.03603 0.03399 0.02728 0.02856 0.02722
Z3 –0.00017 –0.00010 –0.00024 –0.00019 –0.00011 –0.00021
Z320072013 0.00001 – – 0.00002 – –
Z320082014 – –0.00006 – – –0.00006 –
Z320092015 – – 0.00008 – – 0.00004
Z8 0.36862 0.34274 0.37332 0.37906 0.34960 0.37424
SP 0.22866 0.22429 0.21975 0.27955 0.27379 0.27275
SP20072013 –0.31455 –0.32947 –0.28673 –0.21847 –0.23671 –0.21121
SP20082014 0.94693 0.86782 0.91964 0.94528 0.86345 0.92398
SP20092015 –0.74787 –0.66222 –0.73400 –0.88131 –0.78948 –0.86051
One percent level of significance.Five percent level of significance.Ten percent level of significance. N ¼ 179, R2  0:22: Estimations with robust standard errors.
aThe dependent variable calculated using the DEA method.
bThe dependent variable calculated using the order-m method. cIn these models, after elimination of insignificant
variables (except for the instrumental variable in the case of the significance of variable Z3) and in relation to varia-
bles concerning social participation, only the SP variable has a significant impact on the examined efficiency.
dModels including only lagged social participation variables. eModels including both the social participation variable
and lagged social participation variables.
Source: Same as Table 2.
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that social participation is one of the factors enabling citizens to supervise politicians
(agents), which leads to an increase in the efficiency of their actions, including their
spending of public investment funds, has been positively verified.
6. Conclusion
This article attempts to identify factors that have a significant impact on the effi-
ciency of communal investment expenditures. The theoretical framework of this work
divides these factors into three groups: those independent of commune authorities,
those partly dependent on commune authorities, and those predominantly or fully
dependent on commune authorities. The research findings confirm that the efficiency
of communal investment expenditures is determined by a set of factors with varying
degrees of dependence on commune authorities. One of these factors is social partici-
pation, a higher level of which leads to an increase in the aforementioned efficiency.
It should be stressed that the positive impact of social participation on the efficiency
of communal investment expenditure confirmed in this article is consistent with
other studies analysing local government efficiency, broadly understood, and carried
out in Italy (Giordano et al., 2009), Norway (Borge et al., 2008; Bruns & Himmler,
2011; Revelli & Tovmo, 2007), Germany (Asatryan & De Witte, 2015; Geys et al.,
2010), Spain (Bosch et al., 2012) and the Czech Republic (St'astna & Gregor, 2014).
Moreover, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first of its type
not only to be conducted for local government units in Poland, but also to take into
account a very wide range of social participation processes. Studies so far have
focused almost exclusively on turnout in local government elections. Nevertheless,
many aspects of public participation are still not included in our study. This is due to
the fact that there is significant data deficit in the Polish public statistics. For this rea-
son, the scope of the study was narrowed down to include only the communes of the
Małopolska Province. Therefore, it should be stated that this study is a starting point
for further analyses in the context of the impact of social participation on the effi-
ciency of communal investment expenditures and, more broadly, the efficiency of
local government. In particular, subsequent studies could review the methodology
used in this study and assess the impact of social participation on the efficiency of
investment expenditure in cities with county rights or, depending on data availability,
in all communes in Poland. Furthermore, the methodology of this study could be
used to assess the efficiency of the investment expenditure of local governments in
other countries, but only after appropriate adjustment, which results from the very
different specificities of local government units around the world.
In addition, the obtained research results have extremely important implications
for both the activities of local policy-makers and the local community. In particular,
local authorities should support and enable citizens to participate in public decision-
making through the implementation of various instruments of public participation.
At the same time, the willingness to participate in public life should come from the
local community itself. Residents should take a keen interest in the activities of their
representatives and how they exercise the power, as this may significantly increase
the efficiency of local government. It should also be stressed that these implications
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are universal, that is, they can be applied to local authorities in different countries.
They are especially important, however, for countries where there is already a certain
framework (legal, social, cultural, etc.) for the development of participatory processes,
while at the same time citizen participation in decision-making remains at low levels.
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